The chapter discusses New York City’s transportation crisis after World War II, spotlighting the explosive return of automobile traffic and the city’s attempts to cope under Robert Moses’s leadership. As the war ended, congestion in New York quickly rebounded to prewar levels, catching city officials off guard. The press was quick to criticize them for not using the quieter wartime years to tackle these problems. In response, Moses defended the city’s record, pointing to a slew of ongoing and planned projects—expressways, bridges, tunnels, and expanded parking—as proof that relief was on the way. Yet, the chapter makes clear that these ambitious efforts were deeply flawed. Instead of solving the crisis, they often made it worse.
Moses’s postwar strategy centered almost entirely on building highways. He pushed for wider boulevards and parkways, nearly two hundred miles of new expressways, and major new bridges and tunnels. This marked a sharp shift from his earlier focus on parks and recreation, and it drew growing criticism from urban planners. They argued that adding more roads simply attracted more cars, creating a vicious cycle of congestion. At the same time, Moses’s projects neglected—and sometimes actively dismantled—public transit systems like trolley lines and elevated trains. This left New Yorkers with fewer transportation choices and encouraged the spread of car-dependent suburbs, a stark contrast to the dense, transit-friendly neighborhoods shaped by the city’s subway system.
The chapter also explores the broader social and economic fallout from Moses’s policies. By prioritizing highways and parkways, often at the expense of commercial traffic and industrial zoning, Moses inadvertently stunted industrial growth on Long Island. Jobs failed to keep pace with the booming population, forcing many residents to commute into the city and straining the already overburdened roads. Parking and street space quickly proved inadequate for the flood of new cars. Meanwhile, public funds flowed disproportionately to projects that benefited drivers, leaving subway and bus riders—often poorer New Yorkers—facing higher costs and longer commutes. This deepened social divides, limiting affordable housing options for those without cars. The chapter argues that only major investment in mass transit could have addressed these challenges, but Moses’s dominance in public debate and funding decisions kept such solutions off the table.
Initially, the public was enthusiastic about the postwar road-building boom, with little awareness of the potential downsides. Critics like Lewis Mumford warned that highways were being built without proper planning, but doubted the public would recognize the dangers until it was too late. As traffic jams worsened, some New Yorkers began to question the wisdom of endless road expansion, floating ideas like banning private cars from Manhattan. Urban planners pushed for integrating mass transit into new highway projects, stressing that the window to secure land for such improvements was closing fast. Despite the practicality of these proposals, Moses dismissed them, missing a crucial opportunity to coordinate road and transit planning—a decision that would have lasting negative effects.
To illustrate the pitfalls of this approach, the chapter examines the Van Wyck Expressway and its connection to Idlewild Airport. Experts argued that extending subway lines alongside the new expressway would have provided far greater capacity and reliability at a reasonable cost. Not only would this have improved airport access, but it would have helped address the city’s broader transportation needs. Moses, however, excluded mass transit from his plans, focusing instead on highways that primarily served wealthier residents and ignoring the wider social impact. Efforts to advocate for transit integration were stifled, as seen in the resignation of planner F. D. McHugh after his proposals were rejected.
Despite mounting evidence that the highway-centric approach was failing—such as the Van Wyck’s immediate congestion and chaos at Idlewild—Moses refused to reconsider his policies. New roads and tunnels, like the Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel, quickly became overwhelmed, repeating the same cycle: each new project briefly raised hopes, only to be swamped by traffic. Public frustration grew, and experts increasingly called for investment in mass transit and pedestrian spaces, but the city’s leadership and media largely stuck with Moses’s vision.
By the early 1950s, reports from groups like the Regional Plan Association highlighted the surge in car commuting and worsening congestion, urging a shift from road-building to rail investment. Still, Moses’s influence ensured these recommendations were ignored. The city became ever more dominated by cars, with quality of life suffering as a result. While the financial success of bridges and tunnels was celebrated, the human costs—displacement and social upheaval—were mostly overlooked. Moses’s grip on power remained firm, shaping New York’s future for decades to come.