The chapter takes a deep dive into the ways Robert Moses, wielding the power of the Triborough Authority and forging key alliances with the Port Authority, dramatically transformed New York City’s transportation landscape in the mid-1900s. It follows the rise of Moses’ influence, the financial and political tactics that cemented his dominance, and the far-reaching, often damaging effects of his car-focused vision on the city and its suburbs.
By the early 1950s, Moses had built up enormous financial clout through the Triborough Authority, which was flush with toll revenue and annual surpluses. Yet this wealth came with strings attached. Both the public and politicians began demanding that Moses use these surpluses to pay off bonds or support the city’s struggling subway system—moves that would have limited his independence. To keep control, Moses realized he needed to spend the money quickly on new projects, ensuring the Authority’s resources stayed firmly in his hands. His ambitions were huge, with plans for projects like the Throgs Neck Bridge, the Narrows Crossing, and Jamaica Bay park that far outstripped even Triborough’s deep pockets. The launch of the Federal Interstate Highway System brought the promise of federal funding, but also new hurdles: interstate projects required working with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Political realities, especially the relationship between Mayor Wagner and Port Authority leaders, made cooperation both attractive and necessary. By partnering with the Port Authority, Moses could tap into both federal and local funding, keeping his projects moving and his authority intact.
Meanwhile, the Port Authority itself had built up a large cash surplus from postwar traffic, but had lost the bold leadership of its early years and was now focused on profit-driven, disconnected ventures. Moses, still driven by sweeping urban planning dreams, saw a chance to use the Authority’s resources for his own ambitious bypass around New York. Despite some initial tension, both Moses and the Port Authority’s business-minded board saw the benefits of working together. Moses needed the Authority’s money and reach, while the Authority needed his political muscle and approval for key projects like bridge expansions and expressways. Both sides also faced outside pressure to improve mass transit and spend their surpluses before politicians could redirect the funds. Their shared interests in boosting toll revenues and integrating projects into the Interstate Highway System led to a formal partnership, marked by a joint study in 1955 that mapped out a comprehensive arterial network for the region.
This “Joint Study” and the resulting “Joint Program” recommended immediate construction of major bridges such as the Throgs Neck and Verrazano, as well as double-decking the George Washington Bridge. These projects were part of a sweeping network of new expressways across the city and suburbs, including the Bergen County and Clearview expressways. At its core, the arrangement was a business deal: Moses leveraged his power, the Port Authority provided funding—especially for the Narrows Bridge, which Moses would control. The program generated huge profits for both authorities, with millions in annual tolls, and solidified Moses’s influence, backed by powerful automotive and construction interests. In the end, the Joint Program was more than just infrastructure expansion; it was a profit-driven coalition that shaped New York’s future according to Moses’s vision.
With the Joint Program and control over funding, Moses enforced strict loyalty among city officials to his vision, which heavily favored highways and car facilities over mass transit. He used his authority to threaten to pull funds or support if any part of his program was questioned, effectively silencing real opposition. The combined financial power of the Triborough and Port Authorities in 1955—over $1.2 billion—could have modernized the Long Island Rail Road, built new commuter parking, created a trans-Hudson rail loop, and upgraded the subway system. Instead, almost all resources went into roads and bridges, with mass transit receiving little to no investment. Between 1955 and 1965, $2.7 billion was spent on highways, while not a single mile of new subway or railroad was built. New York’s mass transit system was left to limp along on infrastructure dating back to the early 20th century, a direct result of Moses’ priorities.
The fallout from these decisions soon became clear as New York’s mass transit system slid into decline. Commuters faced daily struggles: many suburbanites had to drive or take long bus rides just to reach overcrowded subway stations, where rush hour felt like a chaotic scramble for space. Promised improvements, like the Second Avenue Subway, were endlessly delayed, forcing more riders onto already packed lines. Despite available funds, technological upgrades and new subway cars were neglected, and a policy of deferred maintenance led to worsening safety and reliability. By the late 1960s, breakdowns, derailments, and even deadly accidents were common, and the system’s cleanliness and comfort had sharply deteriorated. Under Moses, New York’s once world-class transit system became one of the worst, plagued by neglect, overcrowding, and a loss of dignity for riders.
The decline wasn’t limited to the city’s subways. Suburban commuter railroads also suffered, especially as Moses’s 1955 Joint Proposal prioritized expressways over rail, draining away passengers and leaving the railroads financially crippled. While some lines like the New Haven and Penn Central started out strong, others, especially the Long Island Rail Road, went bankrupt and survived only through state intervention. As private companies, the railroads couldn’t compete with the heavily subsidized public authorities, leading to mounting losses, fare hikes, and service cuts. This created a vicious cycle: each fare increase and service reduction pushed more commuters onto highways, further eroding the railroads’ customer base. By the 1960s, service had fallen dramatically; the Long Island Rail Road, once a robust operation, ran fewer trains despite a booming commuter population. The squalid conditions—filthy, broken-down cars, chronic delays, and uncomfortable seating—stood in stark contrast to the affluence of its suburban riders. Despite their material wealth, commuters endured daily indignities and discomfort, all because policy decisions had neglected mass transit in favor of highways.
The human toll of these policies was severe. Long Island Rail Road commuters faced harsh, dehumanizing conditions: trains were freezing in winter and sweltering in summer due to outdated, poorly maintained equipment, with temperatures dropping to 29 degrees in winter and soaring to 98 in summer. Chronic delays, frequent breakdowns, and cancellations—like the infamous “Phantom” train—only added to the frustration. These conditions led to widespread psychological stress, known as “commuter syndrome,” affecting three out of four riders. Over time, commuters became numb to the daily discomfort, accepting exhaustion and lost time as a normal part of life. The chapter highlights the deep, often invisible human cost of these conditions, shaped by Moses’ transportation policies, and how they eroded both individual well-being and family life.
Beyond the immediate impact on commuters, the chapter explores the broader consequences for urban and suburban development. Once models of efficiency, suburban railroads like the New Haven fell into neglect and bankruptcy as Moses prioritized road construction, fueling massive suburban sprawl and car dependency. The development of the Long Island Expressway, without any rapid transit integration, encouraged low-density, car-oriented communities, eroding the region’s natural beauty and sense of community. The author argues that integrating rapid transit could have fostered higher-density, walkable neighborhoods, preserved open space, and improved quality of life, but Moses’s vision ultimately turned Long Island into a sprawling, automobile-dependent suburb.
The chapter makes it clear that building rapid transit along the Long Island Expressway was crucial for addressing Long Island’s unique transportation challenges. As a dead-end island with all major connections to the west, toward New York City, Long Island faced explosive population growth in Nassau and Suffolk counties, with most new residents still dependent on jobs in Manhattan. The existing roads were already overwhelmed, and forecasts predicted massive increases in car commuters, making highway expansion impractical—sixty new lanes would have been needed just to keep up. Only mass transit, such as trains or dedicated bus lanes, could have handled the projected commuter volume efficiently. Despite planners’ pleas, Moses refused to include rapid transit or even bus lanes in the expressway’s design, missing what the author calls Long Island’s last real chance to solve its transportation crisis.
In its final pages, the chapter examines the long-term fallout of Moses’s decisions. His refusal to set aside space or funding for mass transit projects, like a rapid transit line to JFK Airport or modernization of the Long Island Rail Road, led to astronomical costs and logistical headaches for future improvements. Even massive investments in mass transit would barely dent car usage, thanks to low population density and deep-rooted car dependency. The core problem is that Long Island’s development was shaped around the automobile, resulting in suburbs too spread out for effective mass transit. A significant shift won’t happen until much higher densities are reached—a solution that remains far off. The chapter argues that Moses’s legacy effectively condemned generations of New Yorkers and Long Islanders to ongoing transportation struggles, with little hope for real improvement.
In the end, the chapter offers a vivid, detailed account of how Robert Moses’s financial and political maneuvering, combined with his unwavering commitment to highways over mass transit, reshaped the New York metropolitan area. The consequences—neglected transit, sprawling suburbs, and chronic congestion—still define the region’s transportation challenges today.